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Abstract
The populist phenomenon has acquired great relevance during the last decade. The emergence of new populist actors and 
the consolidation of the use of social media such as Twitter are transforming the field of political communication. The objec-
tive of this paper is to know the agenda set by the leaders of the main European populist political parties on Twitter, as well 
as the strategy they use and the user interaction achieved. The sample consists of the 2,310 tweets published by the leaders 
of Podemos, the 5 Stelle Movement, France’s National Front and UKIP during three random time periods. The results show 
a low degree of thematic fragmentation, the launch of proposals instead of attracting voters, and the existence of a strong 
negative correlation between the number of published tweets and user interest.
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Resumen
El fenómeno populista ha adquirido una gran relevancia durante la última década. El surgimiento de nuevos actores popu-
listas junto con la consolidación del uso de redes sociales como Twitter están transformando el campo de la comunicación 
política. El objetivo de este artículo es conocer la agenda planteada en Twitter por los líderes de los principales partidos 
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políticos populistas europeos, así como la estrategia que emplean y la respuesta obtenida por parte de los usuarios. La 
muestra está integrada por los 2.310 tweets publicados por los líderes de Podemos, el Movimento 5 Stelle, el Frente Nacional 
y el UKIP durante tres periodos temporales aleatorios. Los resultados plantean un bajo grado de fragmentación temática, 
el lanzamiento de propuestas frente a la captación de votantes y la existencia de una fuerte correlación negativa entre el 
número de tweets publicados y el interés de los usuarios.
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1. Introduction
Populist parties and leaders are gaining an increasingly pro-
minent role in Western democracies. In the words of Mud-
de (2004, p. 1) we are witnesses of a “populist zeitgeist”, the 
emergence of a new era in which populist political parties 
have been introduced in numerous European parliaments. 
The Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), Party for Freedom (PVV) 
in the Netherlands or the Alternative for Germany (AfD) 
achieved the support of more than 20% of the electorate 
in the last elections. Others, such as Law and Justice (PiS) in 
Poland or the Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union in Hungary, even 
govern in their respective countries. Recently, in the Italian 
March 2018 elections, Movimento 5 Stelle obtained 32.66% 
of the votes, making it the most voted party.
This increase in support for left-wing and right-wing popu-
list political actors (Rooduijn, 2015) is due, amongst other 
factors, to the increased use of social media (Mudde, 2016). 
Platforms such as Twitter or Facebook allow them to skip the 
formalities from conventional media and share their mes-
sages much more directly with their audience (Engesser; 
Fawzi; Larsson, 2017). This way, they can set an alternative 
agenda to that of conventional media (Enli; Skogerbø, 2013; 
Galán-García, 2017) and launch functions ranging from in-
formative self-mediation (Cammaerts, 2012) to interaction 
with the public (Alonso-Muñoz; Marcos-García; Casero-Ri-
pollés, 2016), aspects that redefine the role played by po-
pulist political actors in political communication and their 
relations with the public and journalists (Jungherr, 2014).
Research on the evolution of populism on the Internet and 
social media at a comparative level is still scarce, and exis-
ting research focuses on the analysis of electoral periods 
(Van-Kessel; Castelein, 2016; Engesser et al., 2017; Ernst; 
Engesser; Esser, 2017). Thus, the objective of this article is 
to analyse how Twitter is used by the leaders of four Euro-
pean populist European parties outside electoral periods to 
analyse their usual communications strategy.
1.1. Populism in the digital environment
Communication plays a fundamental role in the development 
and growth of populism (Jagers; Walgrave, 2007; Block; 
Negrine, 2017). While the traditional media context makes 
it difficult to get into the news (Shoemaker; Vos, 2009), the 
digital environment allows the circumvention of the filter of 
conventional media that are often hostile to them (Groshek; 
Engelbert, 2013), allowing their messages to reach citizens 
directly (Bennet; Manheim, 2006; Vaccari; Valeriani, 2015). 
Populist politicians capitalise the power and influence of so-
cial media in the development of public opinion by dissemi-
nating populist ideas, such as attack on the elites or defence 
of the people (Engesser et al., 2017). Gerbaudo (2014) calls 
this phenomenon Populism 2.0.
Twitter offers great advantages to populist political actors. 
Its immediate, free-of-charge, easy to use, interactive capa-
city and virality make Twitter an essential tool for the com-
munication strategy of this type of actor, who often have 
more limited budgets than conventional parties (Strand-
berg, 2008). Precisely, it is the last two characteristics that 
attract the most the attention of the populists. On the one 
hand, the fact that Twitter offers an unmediated communi-
cation allows them to maintain direct contact with the peo-
ple, the main recipients of their messages, and elude their 
enemies, the elites, who control the conventional media 
(Van-Kessel; Castelein, 2016).
On the other hand, the viralising capacity of Twitter allows 
its messages to reach a greater number of people quickly 
and easily (Bartlett, 2014; Elmer, 2013) and even to be able 
to access the media agenda more easily (Casero-Ripollés; 
Feenstra; Tormey, 2016). This aspect is very useful for po-
pulist political actors given the difficulty they have in disse-
minating and introducing their own issues and approaches 
in society. In addition, the fact that social media encourage 
homophily (Colleoni; Rozza; Arvidsson, 2014) allows their 
messages to have a better and greater reception by their fo-
llowers, who are more receptive to listening and retransmit-
ting them, generating an echo chamber dynamic (Jamieson; 
Cappella, 2008; Jacobs; Spierings, 2016).
Research such as that of Enli (2017) has demonstrated that 
social media has a great impact on the definition of the pu-
blic agenda, especially for those actors that are not part of 
the elite. The case of Podemos is paradigmatic in this sense. 
Through the activation of the two-way street mediatization, 
the party managed to incorporate its proposals into conven-
tional media (Casero-Ripollés; Feenstra; Tormey, 2016).
Previous bibliography on the agenda posed by political 
actors on Twitter has focused on electoral campaigns and 
highlighted the fact that electoral acts and media-related 
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issues cover a greater number of messages in their commu-
nicative strategy (Zugasti; Pérez, 2016; López-Meri; Mar-
cos-García; Casero-Ripollés, 2017). However, some authors 
warn of the need to study other time periods, since the digi-
tal environment favours the so-called permanent campaign 
(Vergeer; Hermans; Sams, 2013), in which the communica-
tion efforts typical of the electoral periods are delayed in 
time (Vaccari, 2008), with only intensity varying over each 
period (Strömbäck, 2007).
López-García’s research (2016) highlights that new political 
actors focus more on form than substance, making an in-
tense use of cyber-rhetoric (Stromer-Galley, 2014) with the 
sole objective of gaining votes. Populist leaders and parties 
differ mostly according to their ideology. Those on the left 
such as Podemos, focus on the defence of social aspects 
such as pensions or the rights and freedoms of the people 
and on criticizing the corruption of the elites (Casero-Ri-
pollés; Sintes-Olivella; Franch, 2017). On the other hand, 
those on the right choose to criticize immigration, collecti-
ves such as refugees or the Muslim culture (Wodak, 2015; 
Fuchs, 2017), promoting an exclusionary political point of 
view. In addition, they also question supranational entities 
such as the European Union (Mammone, 2009).
In all these cases, concrete proposals are relegated to the 
background and give way to frame based on political stra-
tegy and power struggles (Strömbäck; Dimitrova, 2006; 
Strömbäck; Aalberg, 2008). The aim is to gain as many vo-
tes as possible, something that authors such as Patterson 
(1993) or Berganza-Conde (2008) have related to political 
disaffection and cynicism towards the political class, an as-
pect that is exploited by populist parties and leaders. (En-
gesser et al., 2017). This would explain the fact that users 
respond better to content that refers to criticism (Lee; Xu, 
2018), humour (Marcos-García; Alonso-Muñoz; Casero-Ri-
pollés, 2017) or politainment (Mazzoleni; Sfardini, 2009).
2. Method
The main objective of this research is to identify the Twitter 
use of the leaders of the main European populist parties. 
Specifically, it seeks to recognise: 
O1. The thematic agenda posed by these actors in their Twi-
tter profile.
O2. The strategy used by the populist leaders in terms of 
sharing of programmatic proposals (issue frame) or obtai-
ning votes (game frame).
O3. The interest attained by Twitter messages launched by 
populist leaders through retweets and favourites.
To achieve our objective, the technique of quantitative con-
tent analysis is used, which makes it possible to understand 
the structure and the components that form the messages 
(Igartua-Perosanz, 2006). The sample of this research con-
sists of the leaders of four European populist political for-
mations. In particular, we analyse the Twitter profiles of:
- Pablo Iglesias (Podemos, Spain),
- Beppe Grillo (Movimento 5 Stelle, Italy),
- Marine Le Pen (National Front, France), and
- Nigel Farage and Paul Nuttall (UKIP, United Kingdom).
It should be noted that both Grillo, since September 2017, 
and Nutall, since June 2017, have left the leadership of their 
respective parties. For the selection of the sample, two cri-
teria were considered:
- the ideological axis, which highlights communication di-
fferences between left-wing and right-wing political ac-
tors. Iglesias and Grillo are left-wing political actor actors, 
while Le Pen, Farage and Nuttall are right-wing political 
actors;
- the old/new axis, taking into account the trajectory of the 
political formations they belong to. Podemos and M5S 
are political parties of recent creation as they are 4 and 
9 years old respectively. For its part, the Front National 
(founded in 1972) and the UKIP (1993) have a much more 
extensive time trajectory.
This article seeks to know the usual communicative strategy 
of populist political leaders, avoiding exceptional periods. 
Therefore, the analysis has excluded the electoral campaig-
ns considering that they can alter the routine use of Twi-
tter by these political actors. Hence, three random time 
periods are analysed: May and November 2016 and March 
2017. However, it is necessary to clarify that the context in 
which the sample is framed is conditioned by the Brexit re-
ferendum and by the repetition of the elections in Spain. 
In this research, only the individual tweets and responses 
have been considered, but not the retweets, because these 
only serve to redistribute information published by other 
users (Larsson, 2015), and are not useful for achieving the 
objectives defined in this research. This includes the study 
of a total of 2,310 messages. The sample was captured using 
Twitonomy and the analysis was carried out using the statis-
tical package SPSS (v.24)
Table 1 shows the analysis protocol used in this research, in 
which 19 categories have been defined for the study of the 
thematic agenda.
3. Results
3.1. The agenda of populist leaders on Twitter
The analysis of the thematic agenda posted by the four po-
pulist leaders on Twitter allows us to identify a variety of 
interesting empirical evidence. 
Firstly, it is observed how Grillo, Farage and Nuttall present 
a very compact agenda, in which more than half of the mes-
sages published cover two topics, while Iglesias and Le Pen 
pose a much more fragmented agenda in which they highli-
ght especially four subjects (Table 2).
Pablo Iglesias is especially inclined to share messages about 
culture and sport (20.5%), two fundamental aspects in his 
life. The leader of Podemos often shares recommendations 
about books, series or movies and even sometimes discus-
ses them with some users. Media appearances (12.3%) and 
Viralisation of messages does not de-
pend solely on the volume of tweets pu-
blished by populist leaders
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information on possible pacts with other political groups 
(15.2%), such as with Izquierda Unida, with those who joi-
ned in coalition in May 2016, which is one of the periods 
analysed.
Beppe Grillo focuses his communication strategy on Twitter 
in criticising the cases of corruption (15.7%) of those accu-
sed in the government of Matteo Renzi, and in proposing 
democratic improvements (38%) such as the suppression of 
politicians’ jurisdictional privileges (in some countries like 
in Spain, some citizens can only be judged by the Supreme 
Court), the suppression of the privileges of the elite or the 
promotion of direct democracy.
The leader of the National Front, Marine Le Pen, proposes a 
communicative strategy based on the defence of small tra-
de, employment and French industry (16.4%) and a propo-
sal of improvements in health and the rights of the disabled 
(11.4%). Her speech focuses on a dynamic of inclusion-ex-
clusion with respect to immigration, making an allegation 
of what she calls “economic patriotism” and alluding to the 
fact that improvements must be for the French people and 
not for the others. Foreign affairs (14.1%), with a clear di-
sapproval of the European Union (EU), and criticism of the 
actions of her political rivals (11.7%) like Emmanuel Macron 
or François Fillon, also have a prominent role (Table 2).
Nigel Farage and Paul Nuttall concentrate their communica-
tive efforts on just a couple of topics. Among those, foreign 
affairs particularly stand out: 66.8% and 37.8% respectively. 
Thus, they focus mainly on the defence of Brexit as the only 
possible way to “regain control” of the United Kingdom and 
“lost democracy” over the years. Farage is also concerned 
about international alliances after Brexit (13.3%), while Nu-
ttall prefers to share his appearances in debates and inter-
views (28.9%).
Secondly, the importance that right-wing leaders place on 
immigration, terrorism and foreign affairs (Table 2) is pro-
minent. In all three cases, the references to these topics 
fulfil a critical function. With regard to immigration and 
terrorism, the criticism is especially focused on the Mus-
lim culture, which they accuse of “not wanting to integrate 
into society” and clearly link with illegality (image 1). Fara-
ge also relates refugees with the increase in terrorism in 
Europe. Immigrants are considered the external enemy to 
Topics Description
Issue frame
Economy Employment, unemployment, salaries, deficit, public spending, debt, crisis, taxes, entrepre-neurship, contracts, self-employment, etc.
Social policy Pensions, health, education, welfare state, social justice, equality/inequality (includes gender violence), housing, immigration, birth, etc.
Culture and sports Cultural industries (cinema, literature, art, conventional media, social media, etc.) and sports.
Science, technology and environment R+D+i, infrastructure of the Network (fibre optic, ADSL, WiFi...), pollution, fauna and flora protection or climate change.
Infrastructures Transport services (railways, airports) and infrastructure such as roads.
Corruption Political corruption in a broad sense.
Democratic regeneration Democratic aspects that need to be renewed/eliminated, such as changes in electoral law, ending the establishment and other privileges of the political class, etc.
Territorial model of the State Territorial organisation of the State. Independence of territories such as Catalonia or Scot-land and nationalism.
Terrorism Terrorism in all its forms.
Immigration Immigration nationally and internationally (refugees).
Foreign affairs European Union or other parts of the world; Brexit.
Defence Army, military spending, national security, etc.
Justice Judicial processes, changes in legislation, prisons, convictions, etc.
Game frame
Horse race and governing frame Strategy and government pacts Intent to build a certain type of government, or possible (/impossible) future government pacts. Surveys and polls.
Politicians as individuals frame Personal topics Personal life of political actors.
Political strategy frame Organisation of political events Organisation of political events such as meetings, public meetings, etc.
News management frame Relationship with the media Information about the appearance of a politician in the media.
No topic Expressions of courtesy such as acknowledgments, condolences or ephemerides.
Other Unclassifiable in the previous categories.
Table 1. Categories used for the analysis of tweet topics
The ideological axis decisively conditions 
the thematic agenda of populist actors 
on Twitter
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Pablo Iglesias Beppe Grillo Marine Le Pen Nigel Farage Paul Nuttall
Economy 3.6 8.0 16.4 1.9 6.7
Social policy 9.6 3.3 11.4 0.0 2.2
Culture and sports 20.5 5.0 4.2 1.4 0.0
Science, technology and environment 2.1 4.0 1.3 0.0 0.0
Infrastructures 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.5 0.0
Corruption 6.1 15.7 0.3 0.0 0.0
Democratic regeneration 3.8 38.0 2.3 0.9 2.2
Territorial model of the State 0.4 0.3 8.0 1.4 2.2
Terrorism 0.7 0.3 2.0 0.5 8.9
Immigration 1.4 0.0 7.2 6.2 0.0
Foreign affairs 3.2 6.3 14.1 66.8 37.8
Defence 0.7 0.0 4.4 0.5 0.0
Justice 2.3 0.7 1.5 0.5 2.2
Strategy and government pacts 15.2 5.0 11.7 13.3 2.2
Organisation of political events 3.6 8.0 6.0 0.9 2.2
Personal topics 2.7 0.7 0.0 0.9 0.0
Relationship with the media 12.3 0.7 3.9 1.9 28.9
No topic 7.5 0.3 2.3 0.9 4.4
Others 4.3 1.3 2.8 1.4 0.0
Table 2. Distribution of tweets by populist leaders according to their topic (%)
be fought, thus activating the friend/foe distinction propo-
sed by Schmitt (1927, 2005). When they talk about foreign 
affairs, purposes are diversified and divided between the 
criticism of the EU and the joy of the victory of Donald 
Trump in the American elections. It is especially relevant 
that Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage and Paul Nuttall place 
special emphasis on the need to hold a referendum so that 
the people can decide if they want to continue or leave 
the EU. This promise of direct democracy is inherent to 
the anti-system challenges of populism and is what really 
distinguishes them from non-democratic extremist forms 
(Mammone, 2009).
Thirdly, it is remarkable that despite not being immersed 
in any official campaign period, the messages referring 
to strategy and government pacts have important wei-
ght in the profiles analysed (Table 2), especially in those 
of Iglesias (15.2%), Le Pen (11.7%) and Farage (13.3%). 
The three leaders use this type of tweet to defend their 
political parties, advancing themselves as the only viable 
option for change and improvement of their countries, as 
well as to criticise the political objectives of their oppo-
nents. These data reaffirm the idea of the increasingly 
remarkable existence of a permanent campaign, in which 
the frontiers between the time before and after the offi-
cial campaign periods are blurred and dilate over time 
(Strömbäck, 2007). Image 1. Tweets about immigration
Source: Twitter
Populist leaders suggest an agenda ba-
sed on a thematic approach, leaving the 
most strategic aspects in the background
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3.2. Program vs. strategy: what do users prefer?
The data show how, with the exception of Pablo Iglesias who 
presents more adjusted results, the rest of the candidates 
clearly chose to prioritise the thematic approach (Table 3). 
That is, to present to the public concrete programmatic pro-
posals that improve the future of their respective countries. 
The populist leaders focus more on exposing and discussing 
the current problems of the society in which they live and 
propose solutions and measures to be adopted instead of 
strategic aspects, whose sole purpose is to obtain votes. 
Therefore, they are committed to promoting a much more 
informative approach in which to provide their electorate 
with information about their electoral program so that they 
can decide which option to choose when the next elections 
take place.
In general, when referring to the aspects related to the 
game frame, the criticism towards the strategy of other par-
ties and political leaders (horse race and governing frame) 
predominates. In this type of messages they use negative 
personalisation (López-Meri; Marcos-García; Casero-Ripo-
llés, 2017) to weaken the proposals of their rivals, as well as 
the pacts and alliances that they have promised to develop. 
It is also interesting to observe how despite the fact that so-
cial media allow humanisation, the publication of intimate 
messages is really limited, since except for Iglesias (2.7%), 
the rest of the leaders present values equal or very close to 
zero. The leader of Podemos does consider it useful to share 
with users their attributes and personal characteristics as a 
way to capture votes and differentiate themselves from the 
rest of the candidates, appealing to the most sentimental 
part of the public with the aim of humanising their figure.
However, the interests of the public differ from those po-
sed by populist leaders on Twitter. The results (Table 4) 
show that the attention of the users, measured in terms 
of retweets and favourites, is inversely correlated with 
the number of messages published. That is, the greater 
the number of messages published by populist political 
leaders, the less the impact on the public through Twitter. 
This generates a “more is less” effect in terms of dissemi-
nation of the populist political message in this social me-
dia. This is detected by the Pearson correlation coefficient 
(r = -0.973), which has very high values between the num-
ber of retweets and favourites obtained for each message 
and the number of tweets published. This data reinforces 
the evidence that users do not prioritise the amount in the 
communicative activity of populist political leaders in this 
digital platform.
Table 4 shows the average of retweets (RT) and favourites 
(FAV) obtained by each tweet depending on the topic, as 
well as the average RT and FAV of the total number of mes-
sages published. In general, users prefer to interact with lea-
ders through FAV than RT. In addition, significant differences 
are observed depending on the topics.
Pablo Iglesias Beppe Grillo Marine Le Pen Nigel Farage Paul Nuttall
Issue frame 54.4 83.9 73.1 80.7 62.2
Game frame
Horse race and governing frame 15.2 5.0 11.7 13.3 2.2
Politicians as individuals frame 2.7 0.7 0.0 0.9 0.0
Political strategy frame 3.6 8.0 6.0 0.9 2.2
News management frame 12.3 0.7 3.9 1.9 28.9
Total 33.8 14.4 21.6 17.0 33.3
No topic 7.5 0.3 2.3 0.9 4.4
Others 4.3 1.3 2.8 1.4 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 3. Distribution of messages based on the issue frame and the game frame (%)
Media RT/
tweet
Media 
FAV/tweet
Economy 397.07 550.60
Social politics 478.47 605.32
Culture and sports 468.39 675.81
Science, technology and environment 553.28 860.70
Infrastructures 168.50 249.75
Corruption 522.39 536.16
Democratic regeneration 389.23 502.98
Territorial model of the State 396.92 618.73
Terrorism 510.82 835.85
Immigration 491.84 639.91
Foreign affairs 796.29 1,271.01
Defence 448.14 639.35
Justice 1,263.97 1,397.37
Strategy and government pacts 687.15 920.57
Organisation of political events 387.88 594.48
Personal topics 580.32 1,022.47
Relationship with the media 590.27 784.47
No topic 621.71 940.76
Others 562.15 894.03
Total 556.91 790.53
Table 4. Average RT and FAV according to the topic of the messages
Twitter does not promote a high frag-
mentation of the political agenda
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The impact analysis of the agenda built on Twitter by popu-
list leaders shows that there are between seven and eight 
topics that manage to attract the attention of users abo-
ve the average. Issues related to justice, including judicial 
processes, changes in the penal and civil codes, or crime, 
are the ones that receive the greatest number of retweets 
and favourites (Table 4). Although the number of messages 
included in this category obtains low values in the leaders’ 
agenda, they lead to a high impact, in quantitative terms, 
among users. Particularly noteworthy is a tweet written by 
Pablo Iglesias in which he criticises the harsh sentence im-
posed by the Audiencia Nacional on Cassandra Vera for pu-
blishing thirteen tweets in a joking tone mocking the death 
of Carrero Blanco by ETA. The message, in which the leader 
of Podemos criticises that justice is more restrictive now 
than 40 years ago, got 7,533 RT and 5,734 FAV (image 2). 
Messages about foreign affairs, such as Brexit or the US elec-
tions held in 2016, also attract the attention of Twitter users 
in a remarkable way (Table 4). One of the tweets with the 
highest number of FAV (24,088) of all the periods analysed 
is precisely one in which Nigel Farage shares a photograph 
with the elected Donald Trump in front of an ostentatious 
golden door in a casual attitude (image 2). The UKIP leader 
shows his gratitude for having been able to share his time 
with the businessman and praises his qualities as the future 
president of the United States.
4. Conclusions
The results obtained allow us to detect several original 
contributions regarding the construction of the agenda on 
Twitter by populist leaders. In the first place, despite the 
fact that this platform encourages self-mediation processes 
(Cammaerts, 2012), it does not encourage high fragmen-
tation of the political agenda. With the exception of Pablo 
Iglesias and Marine Le Pen, the rest of the candidates pre-
sent a very compact and concentrated agenda around two 
issues. As such, the digital environment does not encourage 
greater diversification and dispersion of the populist politi-
cal message.
The second contribution refers to the importance that ri-
ght-wing populist leaders attach to issues related to immi-
gration, terrorism and foreign affairs, while in the profiles 
of left-wing populist leaders their presence is relatively low, 
as previous research had already detected (Casero-Ripo-
llés; Sintes-Olivella; Franch, 2017). On the contrary, they 
are more inclined to comment on matters related to social 
policies, corruption or democratic regeneration. Thus, the 
ideological axis decisively conditions the thematic agenda 
of populist actors on Twitter. The broad range of issues re-
lated to immigration, terrorism and foreign affairs is carried 
out in terms of inclusion-exclusion of groups, fostering an-
tagonism between us and them, immigrants, who are pre-
sented negatively and even linked explicitly with the rise 
of terrorism in Europe. Using an anti-immigration rhetoric, 
they seek to defend the pure people and differentiate them 
from the others, who do not want to adapt to the society 
that welcomes them and who do not assume their cultu-
re or their values (Wodak, 2015). The negative discourse is 
reinforced by the presence of messages that highlight the 
need to hold a referendum so that the people can decide 
if they want to continue in the European Union and allow 
immigrants to enter or leave and restrict their access. The 
promises of direct democracy are what really differentiate 
populist actors from undemocratic forms of political partici-
pation (Mammone, 2009).
The third contribution demonstrates that populist leaders, 
Image 2. Subjects addressed by the leaders that are of most interest to 
the public
Source: Twitter
Right-wing populists give priority to is-
sues such as immigration, which are pre-
sented in terms of inclusion-exclusion
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Left-wing populists stand for proposals 
on social policies or democratic regene-
ration
although they are better known for their forms than for 
their contributions, propose an agenda based on the the-
matic approach (issue frame). They prioritise concrete pro-
grammatic proposals to improve the problems of society, 
delegating aspects of more strategic character into second 
place, something that does not match what was previously 
detected in the literature (López-García, 2016). However, it 
would be interesting to study whether they maintain this 
strategy during elections or modify it and opt to prioritise 
the game frame approach, and with it the rhetoric of Twit-
ter itself (Stromer-Galley, 2014).
Fourth, the data obtained reveals a significant presence of 
issues related to government treaties. This is especially me-
aningful given that none of the periods studied refers to offi-
cial campaign periods. With the use of this strategy, which 
usually occurs after elections are held (Strömbäck, 2007), 
populist leaders seek to present themselves to the public as 
valid political options capable of governing and, therefore, 
to be considered for future elections.
The fifth contribution refers to the presence of a dissonance 
between the agenda of populist leaders on Twitter and the 
interests of users. The issues that exploit the populist poli-
tical agenda are not those that get more attention from the 
public. The interest of the public is focused on those mes-
sages that prioritise the spectacularisation of politics or that 
use resources such as irony or humour. The use of this type 
of resource allows a greater connection and understanding 
between a leader and his voters (Enli; Skogerbø, 2013).
Finally, in sixth place, it has been identified that when po-
pulist leaders follow a similar communicative strategy on 
Twitter, the number of RT and FAV they get for each mes-
sage is inversely proportional to the number of messages 
disclosed. That means, the interest of the public decreases 
when the number of published tweets increases and vice 
versa. It therefore generates a “more is less” effect in ter-
ms of dissemination of the populist political message. Users 
do not reward the number of messages posted. In this con-
text, viralisation does not depend solely on the volume of 
messages published, but on other factors related mainly to 
the content of the message. This set of contributions im-
plies new ways of understanding the dynamics of construc-
tion of the political agenda on Twitter by populist leaders in 
non-electoral periods in the European context. 
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